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1961] RECENT CASES
Five states, Colorado, Montana, New York, North Dakota and Texas,1 5
aware of the inherent danger of incriminating circumstantial evidence, re-
quire some type of direct evidence. This statutory requirement eliminates any
question as to the quantum or type of evidence necessary in North Dakota.
This seems to be the logical approach, especially in those jurisdictions demand-
ing the death penalty. Further appeal may result in the reversal of the de-
cision here, but if not, legislation of the type found in North Dakota may
necessarily result.
R. STEFANSON.
NAMES - CHANGE - RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AND SUFFICIENCY OF REASON. -
Petitioner sought to change his surname from Rusconi to Bryan. A reason for
the petition was the wife's distaste of the Italian heritage. The lower court
upheld the objection of petitioner's relatives, that the petition was an "un-
American" affront to persons of Italian origin. The Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts in reversing held that the right to change one's name is very broad;
that objections of "uin-Americanism" and the alleged affront to Italian people,
did not constitute legal cause for denial of the petition. In re Rusconi's Pe-
tition, 167 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1960).
At common law mere adoption and use of a name constituted a permissible
change without resorting to legal proceedings, if such change was not for a
dishonest purpose.1 State statutes were not meant to abrogate this common law
right,2 but rather to aid and facilitate recording such change.3 The problem
of statutory name change lies in the fact that the change is generally not a
question of right but one of judicial discretion. 4 Several states have enacted
statutes in this respect, which are in general agreement as to the require-
ments for name change. 5  In North Dakota an application to change a name
of supposed offenders, charged with the murder of persons who survived their alleged
murderers."
15. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 (1953) "...nor shall any person suffer the death
penalty who shall have been convicted on circumstantial evidence alone."; Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 94-2510 (1947) "No person can be convicted of murder or manslaughter
unless the death of the person, alleged to have been killed, and the fact of the killing
by the defendant as alleged, are established as independent acts; the former by direct proof,
and the latter beyond a reasonable doubt."; N.Y. Pen. Law § 1041 (1944) "What proof
of death required- No person can be convicted of murder or manslaughter unless the
death of the person alleged to have been killed and the fact of killing by the defendant,
as alleged, are each established as independent facts; the former by direct proof, and the
latter beyond a reasonable doubt."; N.D. Rev. Code § 12-2788 (1943) "Independent
Facts Necessary to Prove Guilt. No person can be convicted of murder, manslaughter nor
of aiding suicide, unless the death of the person alleged to have been killed and the fact
of the killing by the accused as alleged, are established as independent facts, the former
by direct evidence and the latter beyond a reasonable doubt."; Tex. Pen. Code art. 1204
(1925) "No person shall be convicted of any grade ef homocide unless the body of the
deceased, or portions of it, are found and sufficiently identified to establish the fact of the
death of the person charged to have been killed."
1. See, e.g., Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910);
Petition of Merolevitz, 320 Mass. 448, 70 N.E.2d 249, 250 (1946).
2. Reinken v. Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 184 N.E. 639 (1933); Huff v. State Election Bd.,
168 Okla. 277, 32 P.2d 920 (1934).
3. See In re Ross, $ Cal.2d 608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852,
255 N.Y. Supp. 616, 617 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
4. Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A.2d 203 (1955); Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga. App.
280, 63 S.E.2d 345 (1951); In re Taminosian, 97 Neb. 514, 150 N.W. 824 (1915).
5. Examples of such enactments are: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. tit. 8, § 1275, 77, 78
(1955); Ga. Code Ann. c. 79-5 (1937); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 96 (1958); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
61 (1958); N.D. Rev. Code § 32-2802 (1943).
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must be made by petition, stating that the applicant is a resident of the
county, and giving the cause for which the change is sought.6
In the absence of fraud an application for change of name should be grant-
ed. 7  But in one instance, petitioner's allegation of "un-Americanism", as his
reason for desiring change, had to be stricken from the petition before it would
be granted. s This seems to be rather technical. Without a showing of fraud
the court should offer a speedy and recorded change of name- any name of
the petitioner's choice. 9
D. M. DELABARRE.
RIPARIAN RIHTS - INLAND WATERS - RIGHT OF AN OWNER OF LAND ABUT-
TING ON INTER-TRAcT LAKE TO THE USE OF THE ENTIRE SUIRFACE. - Plaintiff
brought an action to enjoin the defedant from constructing and maintaining a
fence through and across two lakes and from taking water fron one of the
lakes for irrigation purposes. The trial court found that the waters overlying
each owner's portion of the lake heds were the private property of the owner
and subject to his exclusive control. It further found that the defendant's use
of the lake water for irrigation was reasonable. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota reversing the judgment in part held that the plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction against the defendant who had erected the fence
across the lake. Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1960).
Title to the unmeandered, intertract land in controversy was conveyed to
Minnesota by the Swamp Land Act.1 An individual may be vested with a
fee simple title to this subaqueous land.2 The English rule that non-navi-
gable lake bottoms are susceptible of private ownership has been applied in
most jurisdictions.3 In the jurisdictions recognizing private ownership, it has
been held that an owner of a segment of the lake bed was restricted to the
use of the water overlying his land while he pursued the usual recreations of
6. N.D. Rev. Code § 32-2802 provides: "Any person desiring to change his or her
name may file a petition in the district court of the county in which such person may be a
resident, setting forth: 1) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of such county
for at least six months . . . 2) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name
is sought; and 3) The name asked for .. "
7. See In re Ross, 8 Cal.2d 608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); In re Slobody, 173 N.Y. Supp.
514 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Bates, Change of Name, Legitimation, and Adoption, 19 Tenn. L.
Rev. 418 (1946); Note, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 268 (1938); Note, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 496 (1950);
Comment, 16 N.C. L. Rev. 187 (1938).
8. In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852, 255 N.Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
9. See Petition of Buyarsky, 322 Mass.. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1948); In re Slo-
body, 173 N.Y. Supp. 514 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
1. Swamp Land Act, 9 Stat. 519 (1850), 43 U.S.C. § 982-988 (1958) "To enable
the several States . . . to construct the necessary levees and drains, to reclaim the swamp
and overflowed lands therein-the whole of the swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit
thereby for dultivation, and remaining unsold on or after the 28th day of September,
A.D. 1850, are granted and belong to the several States respectively . . ."
2. 43 U.S.C. § 983 (1958) "... at the request of the governor of any State in
which said swamp and overflowed lands may be, to cause patents to be issued to said
State therefor, conveying to said State the fee simple of said land."
3. Crutchfield v. F. A. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1954); Bannon v.
Logan, 66 Fla. 329, 63 So. 454 (1913); Sanders v. DeRose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331
(1934); State Game & Fish Commission v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9
(1940); Walden v. Pines Lake Land Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 249, 8 A.2d 581 (1939).
